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Challenges in static analysis of mobile malware 
have stimulated the need for emulated, dynamic 
analysis techniques. Unfortunately, emulating mobile 
devices is nontrivial because of the different types of 
hardware features onboard (e.g., sensors) and the 
manner in which users interact with their devices as 
compared to traditional computing platforms. To test 
this, our research focuses on the enumeration and 
comparison of static attributes and dynamic event 
values from sensors and resources within Android 
runtime environments on physical devices and within 
several online services’ analysis environments. 
Utilizing the results from enumeration, we develop 
two different Android applications that are successful 
in detecting and evading the emulated environments 
utilized by those mobile analysis services during 
execution. When ran on physical devices, the same 
applications successfully perform a pseudo-malware 




1. Introduction  
 
Mobile malware authors are becoming more 
proficient in the traditional ways of evading detection 
and are developing new ways of defeating the security 
roadblocks they encounter as well. Part of their success 
in doing so comes from the inherent characteristics of 
mobile devices themselves. Challenges in static 
analysis of malware have stimulated the need for 
emulated, dynamic analysis techniques. Unfortunately, 
emulating mobile devices is nontrivial because of the 
different types of hardware features onboard (e.g., 
sensors) and the manner in which users interact with 





1.1. Motivations and goals 
 
Modern mobile devices now come outfitted with a 
variety of hardware and sensors that users can tap into 
for sending and receiving input and monitor for state 
changes. Mobile applications are becoming so 
dependent on these additional sensors and hardware 
features that we have come to expect their 
availability—so much so it has created new paradigms 
in programming (e.g., context-aware programming) 
[1].  
Unfortunately, context-aware programming and the 
application programming interfaces (APIs) that enable 
such functionality also allow for malicious, context-
aware attacks on mobile devices. Most can envision 
how a proximity or location-based attack from a 
malicious application would be triggered; however, it 
is just as feasible that the trigger could come from an 
audio cue, the snapping of a photo, or a change in 
acceleration indicating the device’s owner is traveling 
by vehicle vice walking. Equally possible is sensor 
functionality being utilized for evasion of malware 
analysis. Our work highlights the challenges faced in 
conducting dynamic malware analysis—commonly 
referred to as runtime or sandboxed analysis—by 
exploring how sensor and other resource-based state 
changes can be leveraged to evade dynamic analysis 
tools and services through detection. 
Our research efforts were specifically designed 
with the following questions in mind: 
1. Can dynamic analysis tools and services be 
enumerated (i.e., fingerprinted) through sensors and 
dynamic resources they simulate, how they simulate 
them, and which ones they are unable to simulate? 
2. In what ways can malicious behavior on 
mobile devices be triggered by sequences of sensor-
based or resource-based state changes (i.e., a mobile 
Konami code to trigger unwanted behavior)? 
3. Can these types of triggering techniques be 
used to defeat common dynamic analysis tools and 
services for detecting malware? 
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1.2. Scope of research 
 
Our research focuses on the development and 
testing of multiple Android proof-of-concept 
applications for enumeration and evasion. Although 
this work is applicable to other mobile platforms, our 
focus remained on Android rather than being all-
inclusive of others such as iOS, Blackberry 10, and 
Windows Phone. 
The proof-of-concept applications were tested 
against multiple physical devices, as well as multiple 
mobile malware analysis services, which we became 
familiar with during an initial literature review. We did 
not attempt to exploit any known (or unknown) 
vulnerabilities within the Android platform during our 
testing, nor within the analysis services that we tested 
against. 
  
2. Android application component 
overview 
 
In order to understand the difference between the 
attack surfaces on traditional software applications and 
Android applications, one needs to understand the 
basic components that comprise an Android app. 
Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers, and Content 
Providers all offer unique functionality that malware 
developers have learned to repurpose for malicious 
means. Additional details regarding these components 
can be found on the Android Developers website. 
Activities can be thought of as a container for the 
user interface of a single page or screen of the app. 
Activities typically are tied to layouts and house the 
buttons, widgets, content, and images seen by a user 
during the Activity’s life cycle.  
Services are components that do not have a user 
interface element, but instead are utilized for 
performing long-running or task-driven operations in 
the background [2]. An example of this is a music 
playing application that defines a Service to continue 
playing music even when application context is given 
over to something different such as using a browser for 
navigating a website [2].  
Broadcast Receivers are components that help 
implement the event-driven programming paradigms 
on Android. An application’s Broadcast Receiver takes 
a defined action after it has received a specific Intent 
object (i.e., an event) broadcast by the system (such as 
the device completing its boot sequence) or by a user-
defined broadcast. 
Content Providers allow for a structured interface 
to the data that an application has created and stored in 
text files, SQLite databases, or any other persistent 
storage solutions. Utilizing this interface, other apps 
can query and potentially modify an application’s data 
based on the behaviors and permissions defined by the 
provider. A common example of this is the default 
Contacts application. By providing a structured 
interface to the contact data stored by this app, other 
applications (e.g., an email app) can easily query 
names and addresses for use.  
Intent objects are worth briefly mentioning for their 
role as the primary means for activating and passing 
data between all application components, with the 
exception of Content Providers. The Android 
Developers website specifies: “Although Intents 
facilitate communication between components in 
several ways, there are three fundamental use-cases: 
(1) to start an Activity, (2) to start a Service, and (3) to 
deliver a Broadcast.” [3]. 
 
2.1. Application security and permissions 
 
As described and detailed on the Android 
Developer website, applications are sandboxed from 
one another and are given access to only a narrow 
array of system resources. These accesses and the 
restriction of access to certain resources are 
implemented through multiple mechanisms. One of the 
mechanisms provided by the Android APIs is 
intentional lack of API support for certain sensitive 
functionality, such as directly manipulating the SIM 
card. Another mechanism is to place restrictions on 
access to sensitive resources through Android 
application permissions [4]. 
For instance, access to a device’s camera is 
protected using this permission mechanism. The same 
goes for location data (e.g., GPS), wireless network 
connections, SMS sending and reading, making phone 
calls, and enabling Bluetooth functionality. To use the 
protected APIs for accessing these sensitive resources 
or hardware features, an application (prior to Android 
API Level 23) must define and request the permissions 
it requires in its AndroidManifest.xml file, 
which is a control and configuration file required by all 
Android applications [5].  
 
3. Android malware analysis services  
 
As the number of Android devices increased in 
availability and popularity, so too did the number of 
new applications being published in the Google Play 
Store. In December 2014, it was estimated over 23,000 
new applications were introduced into the Google Play 
Store [6]. The large number of new submissions each 
month requires a scalable solution to analyze 
applications for malicious or benign behavior. Google 
recognized this early on and publicly announced the 
use of Google Bouncer, an automated service capable 
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of scanning existing and newly submitted applications, 
in February 2012 [7]. Prior to Google Bouncer 
however, there were efforts both in commercial and 
academic realms to create similar sandboxing analysis 
services. AASandbox was likely one of the first to do 
so [8], and Neuner et al. recently presented an excellent 
comparison of several of those tools and services [9].  
All of the analysis services we investigated 
provided some combination of static and dynamic 
analysis techniques. Additionally, the services all 
provide some sort of downloadable or web-accessible 
report based on their analysis of an Android APK 
submission. These reports highlight various static or 
dynamic findings. Some services provide additional 
details such as network packet captures of traffic 
generated by the submitted APKs, or verbose android 
log files based on the Android logcat tool.  Each 
service provides search functionality across their 
reports, typically by MD5 hash signatures. 
Below is a listing of the Android malware services 
we utilized. Some services were not available (e.g. site 
unreachable/offline) during various phases of our 
testing, and Joe Sandbox specifically blacklisted our 
efforts at a certain point after informing us their Terms 
of Use prohibits detecting and/or manipulating runtime 
environment data. 
 
• Android Sandbox • Andrubis 
• APKScan • CopperDroid 
• Joe Sandbox • Mobile-Sandbox 
• SandDroid • TraceDroid 
• VisualThreat  
 
3.1. Static analysis techniques 
 
Static analysis techniques performed by the 
services we investigated typically involved unpacking 
the submitted APK file and parsing information from 
its AndroidManifest.xml file. Information 
provided from this action typically includes Android 
permissions specified for the application and which 
application components were declared. For some 
services, this listing of application components was 
used to guide later dynamic analysis efforts in 
stimulating specific behaviors.  
As part of the static analysis, most services also 
attempted to convert DEX files back to the 
Java.class files from which they were derived. 
Open source tools such as dex2jar were likely used for 
this process. 
The majority of the services we investigated also 
performed some hash-based signature comparisons 
against known malware in repositories such as 
VirusTotal.  
3.1. Dynamic analysis techniques 
 
In the services we investigated, dynamic analysis 
was performed in a variety of environments and at 
differing inspection levels. The inspection levels 
included analysis done fully outside the Android OS 
(i.e., at the hypervisor level), strictly within the Dalvik 
virtual machine running the application, or some blend 
of both. Most service frameworks were likely setup on 
QEMU hypervisors based on our findings of various 
services utilizing default Android SDK Android 
Virtual Devices (AVD) as foundations for their 
runtime environments.  At least one service indicated 
physical devices were sometimes used in a distributed 
analysis approach.  
Data taint propagation (commonly referred to as 
taint tracking) was used across several services to 
detect potential sensitive data leakage of items such as 
phone contacts and unique device numbers. TaintDroid 
is a popular tool for this and was identified as being 
used in several of the services we investigated.  
Event stimulation—such as changing the 
emulator’s GPS location, performing touchscreen 
presses, or modifying battery levels—was also used as 
a dynamic analysis technique in several services. Tools 
such as monkey and MonkeyRunner, which come as 
part of the Android SDK, were identified in some 
services as the primary way in which event stimulation 
was achieved. Other dynamic analysis techniques 
included method tracing, code coverage comparison, 
monitoring of system level calls, phone call and SMS 
event monitoring, network traffic captures, and file 
access logging.  
 
4. Environment enumeration 
 
Our tests focused on exploring how Android 
malware analysis services attempt to emulate not only 
physical hardware features (e.g., location data from a 
GPS receiver), but dynamic resources on a phone as 
well (e.g., contacts, call logs, SMS, etc.). By 
enumerating and observing what data values and 
attributes are provided (or not provided), we hoped to 
discern notable differences between analysis services 
and physical devices that would aid in our detection 




Each Android application we developed attempts to 
capture basic data values and attributes of a sensor, 
hardware feature, or other dynamic resource. These 
data values and attributes are directly accessible 
through proper Android API method calls and, when 
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required, proper Android permissions declared in the 
AndroidManifest.xml configuration file. We did 
not attempt to circumvent or exploit any Android 
platform feature for purposes of these tests. 
To account for differing API levels supported by 
the four physical devices and nine analysis services 
tested, we were required to support Android API levels 
8 through level 21. 
In order to capture results of the tests being 
performed by each application, we setup an Amazon 
EC2 instance running a basic Apache web server with 
PHP. Each application included method calls to 
perform HTTP POST requests to our EC2 instance, 
with all results being stored in name-value pairs. 
Simple PHP scripts on the server parsed out POST 
parameters and wrote them to individual log files for 
later retrieval via SFTP.  
Each proof-of-concept application had a unique 
APK for physical devices we tested and for the 
analysis services. The only difference across the 
versions for an individual proof-of-concept application 
was the URL chosen for submitting the data values and 
attributes via HTTP POST parameters. This also 
provided us with separate MD5 hash values for each 
application built per malware service.  
In addition to sending all results to our EC2 
instance via HTTP for logging, results are displayed on 
the Android device or emulator screen using a 
TextView object. Several of the services provided 
screen captures of submitted applications during 
runtime as part of their resulting report, so this served 
as a secondary measure for capturing data generated 
from each service. 
During runtime of each Android application, we 
also captured various static heuristics about the device 
or emulator performing code execution. The Android 
android.os.Build API provides various public 
member fields such as Build.DEVICE, 
Build.BRAND, Build.MODEL, Build.PRODUCT 
Build.MANUFACTURER, Build.BOARD, and 
Build.VERSION.SDK_INT, which all give some 
insight as to the type of hardware and operating system 
version (i.e., Android API level) utilized for executing 
an application. This design allowed us to observe 
several instances where an application we submitted to 
a single analysis service was executed by at least two 
separate environments with differing features (e.g., 
different API levels). 
In total, we created 15 applications to perform 
environment enumeration: SensorList, LocationGPS, 
LocationNetwork, Accelerometer, Magnetic Field, 
Orientation, Temperature, Proximity, Battery, 
Bluetooth, Audio, PhoneState, SMS, CallHistory, and 
Contacts.  
For purposes of this publication’s conciseness we 
have only detailed three of them. Full details and 
results can be found in our original thesis work1. 
 
4.2. The SensorList application 
 
As stated on the Android Open Source Project 
(AOSP) website: “Android sensors give applications 
access to a mobile device’s underlying physical 
sensors. They are data-providing virtual devices 
defined by the implementation of sensors.h, the sensor 
Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL).”  [10] 
Data provided by these types of virtual sensors 
comes from corresponding physical hardware features 
onboard systems running Android such as 
accelerometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers, 
barometer, humidity sensors, pressure sensors, light 
sensors, and proximity sensors. 
Each Android sensor has an associated sensor type, 
which is accessed via the Sensor.getType method 
call. Official Android sensor types are defined in 
sensors.h (currently 25 official types) and are 
documented within the Android SDK APIs, describing 
what data attributes and methods can be called utilizing 
that sensor [10]. Manufacturers implementing Android 
on their devices may utilize hardware not defined by 
Android open-source specifications and therefore 
assign new temporary types to support corresponding 
sensors [10]. Our testing of the SensorList application 
on physical devices also gave evidence to this. 
Our results provided several insights based upon 
what sensors were listed as being implemented by each 
individual analysis service.  
First, none of the services implemented any 
manufacturer-specific sensor types (i.e., unofficial 
sensor types with numbers above 25). Each physical 
device tested had at least one manufacturer-specific 
sensor type, with the LG Nexus 5 indicating eight 
different ones.  
Second, five of the nine services provided the exact 
same five sensor types:  ORIENTATION, 
ACCELEROMETER, GEOMAGNETIC_FIELD, 
TEMPERATURE, and PROXIMITY. The other 
services provided one or zero sensor types as 
implemented. The physical devices all gave results 
indicating at least 17 different sensor types. 
Unsurprisingly, the aforementioned five sensor types 
are exactly the same five sensor types provided by an 
Android SDK default virtual device (AVD), which we 
confirmed by running SensorList in a default AVD.  
This suggests the runtime environments for these 
                                                
1 Thesis work: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45163 
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services are likely built upon a default-provided AVD 
as a starting foundation. 
Third, none of the physical devices we tested 
provided the TEMPERATURE sensor type (it has been 
deprecated for some time now); however, five of the 
analysis services did.  
Lastly, the sensor names associated with each of 
the sensors provided by the malware analysis services 
all began with the string Goldfish. For instance, the 
VisualThreat sensor name for its accelerometer is 
Goldfish 3-axis Accelerometer, whereas the Samsung 
Galaxy S4 sensor name for its accelerometer is K330 
Acceleration Sensor. This Goldfish string is likely an 
artifact left over by the analysis services building upon 
an Android SDK-provided Android Virtual Device 
(AVD) as a starting foundation for their runtime 
environments. 
 
4.3. The LocationGPS and LocationNetwork 
applications 
 
The Android platform provides developers two 
separate methodologies (i.e., framework APIs) for 
accessing and utilizing location data (e.g., GPS, cell 
tower, or Wi-Fi location). Their recommended method 
for utilizing location services is via the recently 
published Google Location Services API, part of 
Google Play Services [11]. This method requires 
developers to include the additional Google Play 
Services SDK while building their applications. 
Additionally, devices (or emulators) that run location-
aware apps using Google Location Services API 
require Google Play Services to be installed on the 
device. For two of the more common Android 
emulators (the default Android SDK emulator and 
GenyMotion), this presents problems as Google Play 
Services is not typically installed by default, nor can it 
be easily installed based on our testing. The second 
(and more traditional way) of accessing and utilizing 
location data is via the android.location API. 
This is the method we chose for developing our 
LocationGPS and LocationNetwork applications. 
At a high level, the android.location API 
has three primary classes for dealing with location 
attributes and information: Location, 
LocationManager, and LocationProvider. 
All locations generated by a LocationManager are 
guaranteed to have a valid latitude, longitude, and 
timestamp; other parameters like accuracy or altitude 
are optional for a given location generated [12]. In 
addition to the higher-level API classes for utilizing 
location data, our LocationGPS application makes use 
of the GPSSatellite API for accessing attributes of 
the satellite data received when a GPS location fix is 
obtained. 
The first noticeable dynamic heuristic was none of 
the analysis services provided more than one update to 
location data when location providers were enabled. 
During executions of the LocationGPS app on all four 
physical devices, multiple new location updates were 
provided usually within a short period of time (i.e., 
under a minute). 
Although it is feasible the GPS receiver on a device 
could be turned off or could lose signal immediately 
after one update, we feel confident that the testing for 
multiple location updates in a short period of time 
would allow detection of an emulated runtime 
environment, specifically when a GPS location 
provider is initially enabled. The same assertion is 
harder to make when locations are generated from a 
Network provider. Location updates may not happen if 
a device’s location is associated with a Wi-Fi access 
point and never leaves the access point’s proximity. 
Our testing of the LocationNetwork app shows this 
when all four physical devices never receive multiple 
updates.  
The next noticeable heuristic showed all locations 
generated by GPS providers in the analysis 
environments lacked any satellite data attributes. In 
fact, when an analysis environment provided a GPS 
location, the number of satellites used in the location 
fix was zero. In contrast, all four physical devices we 
tested provided all satellite data attributes and the 
location fixes for each device ranged between six and 
twelve satellites being used.  
Another noteworthy heuristic was how believable 
the locations generated by GPS or Network providers 
were. Of the three GPS locations obtained, one service 
gave coordinates in the ocean off the coast of Somalia 
(Mobile-Sandbox), another gave coordinates in the 
middle of the Arabian Sea (SandDroid), and a third 
service gave coordinates in Antarctica (CopperDroid), 
as shown in Figure 2. Interestingly, ANDRUBIS and 
TraceDroid both provided the exact same location data 
(using a Network provider). The latitude and longitude 
for this location placed it near an urban location of 
China. Also noteworthy was how much accuracy was 
given in the latitude and longitude values. Most values 
went out to 14 or 15 decimal places; however, 
SandDroid’s locational data gave latitude of 14.0N and 





Table 1.   LocationGPS application results 
Attribute Tested or Implemented 





















































































Is GPS Provider enabled? ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Location provided? ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔   
Multiple updates provided?  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔        
Location accuracy (m)  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔        
Location altitude (m) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔        
Location bearing (degrees) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔          
Location latitude (degrees) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔    ✔  ✔ ✔   
Location longitude (degrees) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔    ✔  ✔ ✔   
Location speed (m/s) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔          
Location time (POSIX time) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔    ✔  ✔ ✔   
Number of Satellites  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔          
Satellite azimuth (degrees)  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔          
Satellite elevation (degrees)  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔          
Satellite signal-to-noise ratio  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔          
              
The last dynamic heuristic we observed was the 
value provided by the Location.getTime method 
for each location obtained. Both ANDRUBIS and 
TraceDroid provided a value of 1342232104000, which 
equates to 14 July 2012 02:15:04 UTC. CopperDroid 
provided a value of 1343174400000, which equates to 
25 July 2012 00:00:00 UTC. SandDroid provided a 
value of 1417449600000, which equates to 01 
December 2014 16:00:00 UTC. Only, Mobile-
Sandbox’s value was reasonably accurate at 
1423036800000, which equates to 04 February 2015 
08:00:00 GMT.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Coordinates depicted from execution of 
LocationGPS on CopperDroid 
 
Although we submitted APK files to each of the 
nine analysis environments at least twice, further 
submissions would likely provide more accurate results. 
For instance, initial submissions for CopperDroid did 
not result in any location information, while later 
submissions did. This was similar across several 
services and likely indicates different runtime 
environments being used for scaled analysis, including 
physical devices vice emulated environments.  
 
4.4. The Accelerometer Sensor application 
 
The android.hardware.SensorManager 
and android.hardware.Sensor APIs provide 
access to all sensor objects and their generic attributes 
such as the sensor’s vendor name and version number. 
The android.hardware.Sensor.Event and 
android.hardware.SensorEventListener 
APIs provide access for capturing new sensor events 
(i.e., changes in sensor values) and the corresponding 
data for the sensor that caused an event to trigger. 
The most significant dynamic heuristic discovered 
during our testing was that each attribute showed the 
same values across all analysis services that provided 
sensor event updates. Specifically, the values provided 
for acceleration force were always 0.0 m/s2, 9.77622 
m/s2, and 0.813417 m/s2 along the x, y, and z-axes, 
respectively. 
55823
Table 2.   Accelerometer application results 
Attribute Tested  





























































Is Sensor enabled? ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Multiple sensor updates? ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Sensor max range (m/s2) 19.6 19.6 39.2 19.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Sensor power consumption (mA) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Sensor resolution (m/s2) 6E-4 6E-4 0.001 6E-4 3E-4 3E-4 3E-4 3E-4 3E-4 
Sensor Vendor (Real or Generic) R R R R G G G G G 
Sensor Version Number 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Event Accuracy 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Avg. force along x-axis (m/s2) for 10 events 0.36 -0.18 0.10 0.36  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Avg. force along y-axis (m/s2) for 10 events -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.00  9.78 9.78 9.78 9.78 
Avg. force along z-axis (m/s2) for 10 events 9.44 10.01 10.37 9.84  0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
          
Another significant dynamic heuristic discovered 
during our testing was the vendor name associated with 
each analysis service’s implemented accelerometer 
sensor. The four physical devices tested had vendor 
names of InvenSense (Samsung Galaxy S5, Samsung 
Galaxy Note 4, LG Nexus 5) and STMicroelectronics 
(Samsung Galaxy S4). All analysis services provided a 
vendor name of The Android Open Source Project. 
Other noteworthy dynamic heuristics discovered 
were associated with sensor power values and sensor 
maximum range values. The power consumption 
indicated by the accelerometer sensor on each of the 
physical devices was less than or equal to 0.4 
milliamperes (mA), while each of the analysis services 
indicated a power consumption of 3.0—roughly 7.5 to 
12 times the value of the physical devices. The sensor 
maximum range value for each of the analysis services 
was 2.8 m/s2—a value significantly lower than the 
physical devices’ maximum sensor range (with 19.6 
m/s2 being the lowest of those). More telling, however, 
is that the maximum value of 2.8 m/s2 given by the 
analysis services suggests incorrect implementations. 
Values given along the y-axis at 9.77622 m/s2 are above 
this maximum value (and were likely implemented so 
as to be close to the force of gravity, thereby suggesting 
a device at rest). 
Interestingly, the Android Sandbox analysis service 
gave sensor attribute data but did not provide any actual 
sensor updates based on accelerometer value changes. 
Additionally, CopperDroid was thought to implement 
an accelerometer based on our findings after executing 
the SensorList application; however, no device or 
sensor data was logged to our EC2 server. It is possible 
in both cases the analysis services executed our 
application, generated accelerometer data, and for some 
reason did not send the data across their networks or 
that the data was interrupted in transit. Network PCAP 
data provided by each of the analysis services’ reports 
gave no further insight. 
 
5. Android emulator evasion 
 
Both Android applications we developed for 
evasion testing first attempt to capture basic values and 
attributes of sensors, hardware features, or other 
dynamic resources. These values and attributes are 
directly accessible through proper Android API method 
calls and, when required, proper Android permissions 
declared in the AndroidManifest.xml 
configuration file. 
Both applications attempt to determine if they are 
executing on a physical device, and, if so, retrieve the 
device’s unique ID (i.e., its IMEI, ESN, or MEID 
value) and send that value to our EC2 server. If the 
application determines it is executing in an emulated 
environment, it will not send the device’s unique ID. Of 
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note, sending the device’s unique ID is a common trend 
associated with malware and aggressive spyware, as 
described in [13] and evidenced in a profile of the 
NickiSpy.A malware instance detected in 2011 [14]. 
 
5.1. Konami Code application (static version) 
 
The first version of the Konami Code application 
we developed focused on testing runtime environments 
against known static attribute values based on our 
enumeration findings. For example, in testing the 
accelerometer sensor, we compared attribute values 
such as its max range, power, and vendor name. This is 
performed by a method called from the application’s 
onCreate method (i.e., it’s initial entry point). We 
chose nine different tests to perform involving various 
values from the SensorList, Accelerometer, 
Geomagnetic Field, Orientation, Proximity, Battery, 
Bluetooth, Audio, and PhoneState applications. Each 
test is called sequentially from onCreate, and if any 
one of them fails, the application will not send the 
device’s unique identification number to our EC2 
server. 
 
5.2. Konami Code application (dynamic 
version) 
 
The second version of the Konami Code application 
we developed focused on testing runtime environments 
against known dynamic attributes and their behavior 
over multiple events. For example, in testing the 
accelerometer sensor, we compared whether given 
force values along each of the three axes ever changed 
over the range of ten accelerometer sensor events. We 
chose three different sensor types for testing 
(Accelerometer, Geomagnetic Field, and Proximity).  
Unlike the static version of the Konami Code 
application, we could not perform tests in a sequential 
manner because we had no control over which sensor 
event occurred at any given time. Instead, any time a 
sensor event was detected, we determined what sensor 
type caused it and then looked to see if the values given 
by this event differed from the previous event values 
for that sensor type. If they differed, the assumption 
became that the runtime environment was a physical 
device. If they remained the same across ten distinct 
sensor events of a given sensor type, we stopped testing 
that sensor and assumed the runtime environment was 




6. Final results and concluding thoughts 
 
Our research had the initial goal of enumerating 
physical Android devices and multiple Android 
malware analysis services through their implementation 
of sensors and other dynamic resources. To accomplish 
this goal, we developed 15 different Android 
applications that captured various sensor and resource 
attributes, in addition to dynamic values associated with 
sensor and resource events.  
Utilizing the results from these 15 applications, we 
explored our next goal of creating triggering techniques 
to perform pseudo-malware actions, or to detect and 
evade emulated Android runtime environments. To do 
this, we created two separate applications based on (1) 
comparing static attributes of sensors and resources 
with known emulated values, and (2) monitoring the 
dynamic behaviors of sensors within the runtime 
environments. 
Our final results from these two applications 
demonstrated how trivial it is to detect and evade 
emulated runtime environments utilized by several 
popular Android malware analysis services. Each 
physical device we tested executed our pseudo-malware 
action, while each analysis service tested was 
successfully evaded.  
 
6.1. Related work 
 
Although our research was not seminal in nature, we 
do feel it contributes to an ongoing area of interest 
within the mobile security community. Foundational 
work in 2012 by J. Oberheide and C. Miller discussed 
several ways they fingerprinted Google’s Play Store 
Android Bouncer and its analysis environment, as well 
as their subsequent methods for evading its runtime 
analysis [15]. At the time of our testing, Android 
Bouncer did not allow outbound network traffic to pass 
their network perimeter, thereby eliminating any ability 
we would have at logging behaviors from that 
environment. Interestingly, Google recently moved to 
include human review for all applications submitted to 
the Play Store for publication [16]. 
Work presented last year at EuroSec detailed how 
various heuristics from static, dynamic, and hypervisor 
(i.e., the virtualization software itself) attributes could 
be used for analysis evasion [17]. Similar online 
services were tested, and our research extends this work 
by exploring and detailing additional sensor and data 
sources within Android runtime environments that 





Table 3.   KonamiCode application results (static version) 
Sensor/Resource Tested  






































































Test 1: Number of Sensors2 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Test 2: Accelerometer Sensor3 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Test 3: Geomagnetic Field Sensor4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Test 4: Orientation Sensor5 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Test 5: Proximity Sensor6 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Test 6: Battery7 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Test 7: Bluetooth8 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Test 8: Audio9 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Test 9: Phone State10 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ ✗ ✗ 
Was Device ID (IMEI) sent? ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Table 4.   KonamiCode application results (dynamic version) 
Sensor/Resource Tested  






































































Test 1: Accelerometer Events11 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Test 2: Geomagnetic Field Events12 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Test 3: Proximity Events13 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Was Device ID (IMEI) sent? ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
                                                
2 Emulated environments were known to only indicate five sensors or less as being implemented. 
3 Emulated environments provided detectable values for accelerometer max range, power, and vendor name. 
4 Emulated environments provided detectable values for geomagnetic field sensors’ max range, power, and resolution. 
5 Emulated environments provided detectable values for orientation sensors’ power, resolution, and vendor name. 
6 Emulated environments provided detectable values for proximity sensors’ max range, power, resolution, and vendor name. 
7 Emulated environments provided detectable values for battery temperature and voltage when current status was queried. 
8 Emulated environments provided detectable values indicating a Bluetooth adapter was not present. 
9 Emulated environments provided detectable values for initial audio volume levels across seven audio streams. 
10 Emulated environments provided detectable values for a device’s unique identification number (e.g., its IMEI). 
11 Emulated environments provided accelerometer events with unchanging values of 0.0 (x-axis), 9.7762 (y-axis), and 0.813417 (z-axis) m/s2. 
12 Emulated environments provided geomagnetic field events with unchanging values of 0.0 (x-axis), 0.0 (y-axis), and 0.0 (z-axis) µT. 
13 Emulated environments provided proximity events with unchanging values of 1.0 cm. 
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6.2. Future work in countering anti-analysis 
 
Because our research demonstrated how easily 
emulated mobile environments can be detected and 
evaded, we believe future work in the area of mobile 
malware should explore multiple methods of countering 
anti-analysis techniques.  
One such method would be to concentrate on better 
simulation for sensor events and other hardware events 
(e.g., battery status, GPS, etc.). We recently came 
across a program called SensorSimulator, which 
reportedly can simulate realistic values on an Android 
emulator and has the ability to store and replay sensor 
event data from actual physical devices. 
Another method might be to abandon using 
emulated environments altogether for malware analysis, 
and conduct scaled testing utilizing large numbers of 
physical mobile devices, similar to commercial 
endeavors like Bitbar.  
Finally, the most promising method we encountered 
while concluding our research came from SandDroid’s 
creator, Wenjun Hu. At the 2014 PacSec conference in 
Tokyo, he advocated for implementing API runtime 
hooks within an emulated environment to intercept 
malicious malware attempting to detect the runtime 
environment [18]. These runtime hooks would then 
allow analysis environments to provide simulated 
results in a lightweight manner, as opposed to 
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